Ukraine’s assault battalions have been fighting Russia in some of the fiercest battles since before the start of the full-scale invasion, and have the casualties to show for it.
In August 2024, the 33rd and 225th assault battalions punched through Russian defenses, to cross the border into Kursk Oblast. At Bakhmut, the 5th Assault Brigade held the flanks of the crumbling city for over 15 months.
In September, Ukraine announced that these assault troops will be separated from the Land Forces and forged into their own military branch, hoping to be done in 2026.
Masterminded by Ukraine’s top commander, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, the initiative is meant to give Ukraine a hard-hitting rapid response force, which can more nimbly “douse fires” along the hottest parts of the front.
But the decision has drawn criticism. Some military observers point to extremely high casualty rates among assault troops and question whether assault units protect their men — or expend them liberally, like Russia does. The use of convicted people, not unlike Russia, has done nothing to quell this criticism.
Others ask why resources are going to a new branch rather than reinforcing exhausted land forces brigades or airborne assault units. And some allege the whole project is General Syrskyi's bid to build a force loyal to him personally, after multiple commanders questioned the logic of the Kursk operation out of reluctance to lose their men.
Lieutenant Colonel Andriy Berezovskyi is in charge of planning for the new military branch. Since joining up in 2017, he rose from squad leader to deputy brigade commander. He helped liberate territory around Kherson, fought in Avdiivka and Bakhmut, and spent a year in the Kursk Offensive.
Now, his job is to ensure the Assault Forces are as effective as possible. Euromaidan Press sat down with Berezovskyi to ask him about his charge.
EMP: What is currently happening with Ukraine's assault forces?
AB: The assault troops are not something new. These units have been operating since the opening days of the war. For example, there is the glorious Aidar battalion, now being transformed into a regiment; they have been fighting since 2014.
Right now the assault battalions are part of the land forces and are being transferred into the Assault Forces as a new branch of the military. We are in the middle of that process.
EMP: Are there specific deadlines for the completion of this process?
AB: We should be fully formed sometime during 2026. I cannot give more precise deadlines.
EMP: What is the logic behind separating assault troops from the rest of the land forces?
AB: They differ in their tasks. An assault service member doesn't sit in one place, he doesn't defend.
Assault troops clean up the enemy, bring in mechanized troops or infantry, then go on to perform a different task in another location. The land forces generally engage in defense or active defense.
The tactics and training are different. Therefore, Ukraine's leadership decided to form a separate command into a separate branch of the armed forces.
The assault troops have shown, and are continuing to show, their effectiveness on the battlefield. These troops, as our commander [General Oleksandr Syrskyi] likes to say, are like firefighters. They take down the enemy at the hottest parts of the front line.
These troops, as our commander likes to say, are like firefighters. They take down the enemy at the hottest parts of the front line.
Lt. Col. Andriy Berezovskyi
EMP: The front line is constantly changing. How are assault forces adapting?
AB: We have a simple task set by our leadership: making quick, correct decisions. As the practice of war has shown, whoever can quickly make the right decision — a comprehensive decision, for which they will bear responsibility—will win.
Two or three years ago, there were fewer drones. Today, there are very large numbers of drones, unmanned ground systems. We constantly improve our training and refine our combat tactics.
Two or three years ago, an assault group numbered eight to ten people. Today, we have learned from our enemy and are using smaller assault groups.
EMP: So the logic behind separating out the assault troops is faster decisions and nimbler adaptation?
AB: Yes.
EMP: How do you deal with personnel shortages in making a new military branch?
AB: There is a directive from the commander-in-chief for all international legions — there are four, I believe — to be folded into the assault forces.
We have our own recruitment center in Ternopil, where we assemble personnel. We also have recruitment centers in different cities, and soldiers can choose which units to serve.
EMP: What are your current priorities as you work to create the new branch?
AB: At the moment, we are forming the command structure and have started building the assault forces training center. The issue of personnel training is very important.
No war can be won without preparation. Assault units require a more comprehensive approach, and the training center we are building requires a lot of time, financing, and resources.
For 11 years, Ukraine has been fighting the world’s second army. To prepare a unit properly, a very large material base is needed, and all this needs to be sourced from somewhere.
EMP: What kind of training do they receive?
AB: Our troops are trained in practical skills for clearing an area or liberating a settlement. We train in topography, orientation within terrain, so personnel know where to go.
EMP: A lot of criticism was directed at the decision to make the assault forces their own military branch. The specific criticism we have noticed was threefold.
Firstly, existing assault forces were criticized for their high casualty rates, which observers linked to the harsh style of commanding officers. People have even compared them to the way Russia does assaults — without protecting their men.
AB: This statement does not correspond to reality.
Losses in assault units can be high, but they concentrate in short periods when our forces enter areas on the verge of collapse — where a breakthrough is imminent and someone must quickly close a gap that did not arise through our fault. We operate where others physically can no longer hold. That is why the statistics sometimes appear skewed.
This is not a systemic issue, not a norm, and certainly not a "Russian model." Russia compensates for incompetence with mass and indifference to the lives of its own people. Ukrainian assault units are precision groups working with small numbers, in the most difficult sectors, trained for highly specific tasks.
As for the alleged "harsh style," very different categories of servicemembers serve in our ranks. Among the Assault Troops there is a special contingent — former inmates — for whom different rules apply, with a different level of task access and an entirely different control system. Wherever personnel with a criminal background are involved, command acts more strictly — this is not a "Russian style," but a matter of safety, discipline, and controllability.
Conditions may differ between units because their structures, roles, and manning systems also differ. The creation of a separate branch gives us the ability to unify standards, equalize training, and scale successful experience more effectively.
EMP: The next criticism stated that instead of making a separate branch to "put out fires," it might be more efficient to spend those resources on existing units, including line infantry and airborne assault troops.
AB: First, it's important to understand the scale.
The Assault Troops comprise a very small segment of the entire army. In terms of replenishment, equipment, and logistical support, we are not in better conditions than the Air Assault Forces. Reallocating our resources to line infantry would not create any systemic or even noticeable strengthening of the front.
Second, the logic of employment is different. Line infantry, the Air Assault Forces, and assault units perform different types of tasks. Airborne and mechanized brigades can conduct assaults, but their primary missions are defense, maneuver, holding key lines, raiding operations, and combined-arms offensive actions.
Assault troops are designed for:
- Local breakthrough,
- Precision seizure of specific objectives,
- Stabilization of critical sectors,
- Operations within narrow time windows that require specially trained groups.
If we simply "dissolved" into the general mass of infantry, command would lose an extremely effective rapid-response tool — one that resolves problems quickly where the situation risks collapsing.
Assault Troops are not a "resource taken away from someone else." They are a distinct instrument created in response to the threats and dynamics of the modern battlefield.
EMP: Finally, some critics alleged that this is General Syrskyi's initiative to create a service branch loyal to him, following multiple commanders' expressions of doubt about the Kursk operation.
AB: This is a manipulative and false claim that has nothing to do with reality.
All servicemembers — whether in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard, the State Border Guard Service, Defence Intelligence, or any other security structure — take the same oath: loyalty to the people of Ukraine.
A Ukrainian soldier has only one loyalty — to the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian people. Not to individuals, not to political figures, not to "centers of influence."
The creation of the Assault Troops is a structural decision dictated by operational needs: establishing a branch specializing in specific missions within a highly dynamic environment. This decision was reviewed by the General Staff, the Ministry of Defence, and the Commander-in-Chief. It cannot be an "individual initiative" of a single person.
Speculation about "loyalty" to particular individuals is harmful to military discipline, dangerous for public trust, and creates ideal conditions for hostile information operations aimed at dividing the army.
The Ukrainian military fights as a single organism. Any attempt to portray it as a collection of "factions" is either a misunderstanding of how the military works, or a deliberate effort serving the enemy.
EMP: Where have assault forces fought during the full-scale invasion? You have mentioned Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Kursk.
AB: In the Bakhmut direction, our 5th Separate Assault Brigade performed combat missions on the outskirts for about 15-16 months — the villages of Ivanovske and Klishchiivka.
At Klishchiivka, there was the 5th Assault Brigade. Then, I was serving in a mechanized brigade, but came to understand how the assault troops work. In cooperation with the 5th Assault Brigade, we carried out the clearing of the Dakhovskoy ravine.
We can also talk about the Kursk operation—a historical first. Assault troops — the 33rd Separate Assault Regiment, the 225th Separate Assault Regiment, at that time still battalions—made the first breakthrough in the enemy's defense, entered the territory of Russia, and began clearing the city of Sudzha.
After that, the assault troops provided an opportunity to make a bridgehead and expand the offensive zone. The airborne assault troops came in after.
It was the assault troops of the 33rd and 225th that made the breakthrough.
EMP: What kind of support do assault force operations get, in terms of drones, artillery, etc?
AB: If an assault group is halted by the enemy and cannot bypass them, drones are used — FPV drones, multicopters like the Vampire bomber hexcopter. Once the enemy is destroyed, the assault group cleans up and continues moving. Everything happens in combination with artillery, communications, intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, and so on.
EMP: What do the assault forces need right now, most of all?
AB: Depending on what our enemy does, we must adapt and rebuild our training centers with maximum sheltering — underground classes, underground marksmanship ranges. All of this requires funding and resources. The process has begun. We will not stop.
Any assistance from our partners, from the US and other countries — it all goes back to the simple human principle that Ukraine has been fighting for 11 years. We did not start the war. In 1991, we were given the right to a democratic country, in which I was personally born.
I don't want to fight with my neighbor and think about how to destroy my enemy with a drone. I would like to build a happy life — a beloved wife, children, and to live. But today the enemy is our neighbor. He is ruthless. Therefore, we will continue to work and destroy him.
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